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A Benefit-Cost Analysis 
of a Bonus Offer Program
Robert G. Spiegelman
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
An experiment is run at considerable expense for the purpose of
providing information to guide the government in decisions to launch
or modify programs.  A major advantage of an experiment is that,
despite its expense, it is much cheaper than the alternative of inaugurat-
ing an expensive program and then discovering that it doesn’t work.
The second advantage is that an experiment can generate more reliable
estimates of program effect than other modes of analysis.  To provide
policy guidance, the effects of an experiment must be translated into an
estimate of the benefits that can be expected to accrue to a program that
replicates these experiments.  
The process of assessing the positive and negative effects of a pro-
gram is called benefit-cost analysis (BCA) and involves adding up ben-
efits and costs and providing a present value estimate of the difference,
called net benefits.  It can be said with some assurance that no program
should be launched that doesn’t generate net benefits (i.e., net positive
effects).  However, this statement is not as simple as it seems, since the
answer as to whether or not a program generates net benefits depends
upon the perspective of the interested party.  A benefit to one group
may be a cost to another, and neither a benefit nor a cost to a third
group.  Thus, it will be necessary to compute net benefits from several
perspectives.  
For an unemployment insurance (UI) bonus offer program, there
are five decision-making groups that one should consider: society as a
whole, government as a whole, employers, claimants, and the UI sys-
tem.  The ultimate test of a program should be whether or not the pro-
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gram generates net benefits to society as a whole.  According to the
“Kaldor compensation criteria” as defined in Kaldor (1939), any
project that generates positive net benefits to society should be under-
taken, since winners (those obtaining the benefits) can pay off losers
(those bearing the costs) and leave a net surplus.  Since society is con-
cerned about the distribution of income as well as its total size, it is
probably unjustified to ignore distributional effects in the calculation of
social benefits (see Okun 1981, p. 276).   However, we have no basis
for explicitly assigning monetary values to distributional changes.  At a
minimum it may be stated that no program should be undertaken that
doesn’t meet the criteria of generating net benefits to society.  
Within society, the groups most directly affected by a bonus offer
are employers and claimants.  In an important sense the employer
group is represented by the UI Trust Fund, and a program that benefits
the trust fund (i.e., results in lower payments out of the fund) is benefi-
cial to employers.  Claimants need not be separately considered either.
Because the program is totally voluntary, it may be assumed that claim-
ants would not participate unless they perceived a net benefit.  
Government as a whole, and the UI system in particular, are the
agencies that must implement the program, and they will not do so
unless there are net benefits from their perspective.  Government is a
net beneficiary if the program generates directly or indirectly more rev-
enues than costs.  The UI system is the front line agency.  The ostensi-
ble purpose of a bonus offer program is to reduce the amount of
insured unemployment.  From the perspective of the UI system, a net
benefit arises if the reduction in UI compensation payments exceeds
direct costs of the program.  If it does not directly benefit from the pro-
gram, but the government as a whole does, then a transfer of funds
among government agencies can be carried out. 
The essential structure of benefit-cost analysis from the perspec-
tives of society, government, and the UI system is described more fully
in the sections to follow.
Society
For there to be net benefit to society as a whole, there must be an
increase in real income greater than the real costs incurred to produce
that income.  Net benefits to society is the sum of all benefits and costs
to the individuals who comprise the society.  As shown in Table 7.1,
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real gains to society occur due to increases in the value of output, best
represented in this program by the increases in earnings of those
responding to the bonus offer by obtaining jobs more quickly. 
The real gains, however, are only the net increase in earnings.  The
additional income due to the more rapid reemployment of participating
claimants may be considered the gross increase.  To calculate net
increase, several deductions should be made.  These include loss in
wages due to poorer paying jobs (if any), lost income due to displace-
ment of nonparticipants, and any loss in earnings due to entry effects
(such loss will only occur if the entry effect results in workers leaving
jobs earlier than they otherwise would).  In addition, many economists
would claim that the benefits to the individual who returns to work
more quickly are less than the additional income by the value of the
home time that is foregone (see Gordon 1973, pp. 133–206).   This
issue is discussed further below.  
The societal costs are the costs of administering the program.
These are the only costs that represent utilization of real resources in
the first round.  Leaving aside the direct benefits or costs of distribu-
tional changes, transfer payments (such as UI compensation and bonus
payments) net out to zero in the first round, since they are benefits to
one group of members (transfer recipients) and costs to another group
(taxpayers).   However, the second round effects of additional transfer
payments may not be so benign.  It is argued by many that increasing
government size has deleterious effects on real income.  If the net ben-
efits to government are negative, this implies a shift in resources from
taxpayers to transfer recipients.  Such a transfer would have income
Table 7.1 Reemployment Bonus Benefits and Costs by Perspective
Parameter Society Government UI Trust Fund
Increased output +
Value of home time lost                       –
Increased tax receipts +
Decreased UI benefit payments + +
Bonus payments – –
UI administrative costs – – –
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consequences—which might be positive or negative—that shouldn’t be
ignored.  In this analysis, second round effects are ignored, because the
bonuses are small relative to total UI payments, and most program
options considered here have benefit/cost ratios for the government as a
whole close to 1. 
Government
Government as a total, not distinguishing either the level of gov-
ernment or any of its functions, represents the whole public body that
collects taxes and dispenses public services.  Any income taxes gener-
ated as a result of additional earnings represents a benefit to govern-
ment.  Any reductions in transfer payments from any of its insurance or
welfare programs that result directly or indirectly from increased
employment of constituents are also benefits.  Thus, a reduction in UI
compensation paid is a direct benefit to government.  Costs to the gov-
ernment include any costs directly or indirectly associated with govern-
ment programs that must increase because of the bonus offer.  Thus,
bonus payments are a direct cost, as is the cost of administering the
bonus offer program.  
The UI System
We are concerned about the net benefits to the UI system, because
it is the agency of the government that would administer the bonus
offer program.  If such a program does not generate net benefits to this
agency, then the program would not be implemented, regardless of its
benefits to larger entities, without a conscious transfer of resources.
Although the experimental bonus payments were not made from the UI
funds, it is logical to assume that bonuses would be paid from the UI
Trust Fund in a regular bonus offer program.  Thus, costs to the UI sys-
tem are bonus payments and administrative costs, while benefits are the
savings in UI compensation payments to claimants.  
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IDENTIFICATION OF BENEFITS FOR 
A UI BONUS OFFER PROGRAM
As previously stated, benefits are defined in terms of the decision-
maker’s perspective.  Under a UI bonus program, increases in output
(or real income) are benefits to society.  Increased tax revenues repre-
sent benefits to government, and reductions in UI compensation pay-
ments are benefits to the UI system and government as a whole.  Each
of these benefits are described in the following sections.
Output (Earnings)
For a bonus offer program, increases in earnings of those respond-
ing to the bonus offer represent increases in output, if there are no off-
setting losses in output from displacement or entry effects.  These
earnings changes are a result of net increases in employment that
derive from the more rapid return to work, adjusted for any changes in
wage rates.  
For the bonus experiments, earnings change has two components.
The first component is a short-run increase in earnings due to more
rapid reemployment after filing for UI benefits.  The second component
represents earning changes over a longer period of time due to the new
job.  If earnings on the new (post-unemployment) job differ from earn-
ings on the pre-unemployment job, then there is a change in the rate of
earnings that might be attributable to the bonus.  These earnings
changes are attributed to the experimental treatment if the post-unem-
ployment wages of bonus-offered claimants and controls differ.  As
discussed in Chapter 5, if job search had been optimal prior to the
bonus offer, then taking jobs more quickly could imply taking less sat-
isfactory jobs.  This would be expected to show up in participants tak-
ing jobs paying lower wages than those being paid to control group
members.  The overriding evidence presented in Chapter 5 is that the
experimental subjects did not take lower paying jobs. 
For there to be positive societal benefits from a bonus program, it is
essential that there be net positive effects on earnings, since earnings is
our measure of societal output.  The results of the experiment, as
shown in Chapter 5, however, do not encourage us to expect such posi-
tive effects.  Table 5.3 shows that none of the Pennsylvania or Wash-
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ington programs have impacts on earnings that are statistically
significant.  Only the single Illinois treatment shows statistically signif-
icant positive impacts on earnings.   Nevertheless, we make estimates
of net benefits utilizing the expected value of the impacts, and six of
the 10 Pennsylvania and Washington treatment groups have an esti-
mated impact on earnings that is positive. 
Reduction in benefits due to entry effects, displacement, or lost
value of home activity are outside of the experimentally induced
effects and are introduced here in the form of sensitivity tests to show
the effects of including reasonable estimates of values of these parame-
ters in the calculation.
Tax Revenues
Any increases in earned income as a result of the bonus offer can
be expected to generate increases in tax revenues collected by federal,
state, or local governments.  These revenues are general to the govern-
mental level and do not automatically accrue to any particular agency,
unless they are user fees, which are not considered in this study.  No
effort is made in this study to precisely estimate income tax burdens,
and no estimate is made of other tax payments that may indirectly
result from high earnings, such as sales taxes.  Most of the bonus recip-
ients would be expected to be in the low (15 percent) federal tax
bracket.  Adding 7.65 percent for FICA and a small amount for state
taxes brings the estimated tax return to about 25 percent of the mar-
ginal increase in earned income.
Change in UI Compensation
A direct effect of the bonus offer is to reduce UI compensation that
results from the earlier termination of benefit receipts by participating
claimants.  These estimates are directly measured by differences in UI
compensation to experimentals and controls, as described in Chapter 4.
Remember, these estimates are for changes in compensation averaged
over the entire assigned population; they are not confined to the popu-
lation of respondents or claimants who collect bonuses.  There are sev-
eral estimates of this difference.  For the BCA, we chose to use the
adjusted means calculations for Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 to estimate UI
A Benefit-Cost Analysis 229
compensation savings in the programs modeled directly on the experi-
mental treatments. 
IDENTIFICATION OF COSTS FOR
A UI BONUS  OFFER PROGRAM
The same issues of identification and association exist for costs as
for benefits.  Social costs accrue if real resources are used.  To the
extent that bonus payments exceed the savings in UI compensation
payments, there are transfers of resources from taxpayers or lenders to
bonus recipients.  Distributional effects aside, these do not represent
first-round social costs.  They would represent costs in future rounds if
the redistribution of income resulted in lower real product.  Only the
costs incurred to administer the program utilize resources in the first
round, and thereby represent first-round costs from all three perspec-
tives.  If there were more substantial distributional costs, their effects
on real output in subsequent rounds would need to be addressed. 
Since displacement of nonparticipants (see Chapter 6) reduces the
earnings accruing to society, they must be considered a cost, offsetting
part (or all) of the benefits derived from additional earnings of partici-
pants.  In addition, any entry effects of the bonus offer generate addi-
tional bonus payments and additional payment of UI compensation,
and they therefore represent additional costs to the UI system and the
government.  Entry effects generate social costs only if the greater use
of the UI system is accompanied by a decrease in earned income.
Lastly, the loss of value of home activity needs to be considered.
Robert Gordon carefully considered this issue in the context of estimat-
ing the revenue costs from job refusal.  He estimated the ratio of value
of home time to previous after tax wage to be 0.206 (Gordon 1973,
Table A-1).   This is equivalent to about 15 percent of pretax earnings.
In calculating net benefits to society, earnings gains will be offset by
the estimated value of lost home time that will occur because of the
more rapid reemployment of program participants. 
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Administrative Costs
The relevant costs are those of an anticipated ongoing program, not
the costs of running the experiment or the costs of starting up a new
program.  Administering the experiment had high costs associated with
the research and with an effort to telescope learning time for claimants
to bring their program knowledge up to a point roughly equivalent to
that which could be expected in an ongoing program two to three years
after start-up.  The 5- to 10-minute enrollment interviews were several
times longer than would be expected in an ongoing program.  The addi-
tional time was used to assure that the claimants received and pro-
cessed the information about the program.  For instance, a single-page
information sheet was given to the claimant, then read to the claimant
by the interviewer, who then asked the claimant several questions to
guarantee comprehension.  In a real program, the interviewer might
simply mention the bonus, hand the claimant the explanatory sheet,
and tell the claimant to be sure to read it.  Administrators in Washing-
ton estimate that two minutes per interview would be sufficient.  The
central staff devoted to the bonus offer would be considerably smaller
than that used to operate the experimental program.  It might consist of
an administrator and one or two assistants, whose time would be taken
in processing and auditing bonus claims, assuring that information
sheets are available to the local offices, and occasionally training inter-
viewers.  Other costs include the costs of communicating disallow-
ances to claimants and operating an appeals process.  The estimates of
staffing and costs to administer a simple bonus offer program are quite
small, totaling only $3 in 1988 dollars, based on estimates made by the
staff of the Department of Human Services in the state of Washington
(Table 9-3 in Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline 1992)1 and reproduced
as Appendix Table 7A.1 herein.  The table shows in detail the deriva-
tion of the cost estimates.
Bonus Payments
For the cost calculation, bonus payments are averaged over the
total experimental population, just as is the change in UI compensa-
tion.  Thus, if 10 percent of the eligible claimants each are paid a $500
bonus, the average cost of the bonus is $50 per claimant.  Chapter 3
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provides estimates of the proportion of the eligible population who col-
lected bonuses.  These proportions are multiplied by the average dollar
value of bonuses paid within each treatment group to provide the esti-
mate of the bonus cost per claimant.
Displacement Costs
Another cost that may or may not arise from the bonus offer pro-
gram is the loss of earnings by nonparticipants who are displaced from
jobs by participants, as described in Chapter 6.
Entry Effects
As discussed in Chapter 6, entry effects are the increases in UI fil-
ings caused by the bonus offer.  This effect will increase both bonus
payments and UI compensation.
AGGREGATION OF THE EFFECTS AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The last step in BCA is the aggregation of benefits and costs.  Two
methods of calculation are used.  First, net benefits are calculated sim-
ply as the difference between all benefits (B) and all costs (C) (i.e., B –
C).  The second method is to calculate a benefit/cost ratio (i.e., B/C).2
For society as a whole, net benefits is the most appropriate measure.
Even if one doesn’t accept the Kaldor compensation criterion (men-
tioned above) that would result in the acceptance of all projects that
generate positive net benefits, it is true that society is not budget con-
strained and therefore can consider any project generating net benefits.
However, governmental agencies operating within budget constraints
would tend to use the B/C ratio, choosing those projects with the high-
est ratios first, and so on down the line of projects with ratios greater
than one until the appropriate budget is exhausted.  Both calculations
are reported here.
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Benefit-Cost Analysis of Bonus Offer 
Program Alternatives from Three Perspectives
The BCA is conducted for 11 alternative bonus offer programs that
replicate the bonus offer treatments in the three experiments.  For each
program, the BCA is conducted from the perspective of the UI system,
the government as a whole, and total society.  Each of the benefit and
cost components that are used in various combinations to compute net
benefits from each of the perspectives are described in the section
below.  
Tables 7.2 through 7.4 show the benefit-cost comparisons for the
six Washington, four Pennsylvania (the declining bonus offer treatment
in Pennsylvania is omitted), and one Illinois bonus offer programs.  
For many of the program options, societal net benefits are quite
large, with B/C ratios in some instances—particularly for the high
bonus offer programs—approaching 100 to 1.  Large net social benefits
and very high B/C ratios occur primarily because the denominator in
the ratio is occupied exclusively by administrative costs, which are
very low for a bonus offer program.  These estimates are based on
expected values.  If statistical properties were included, the confidence
in these estimates would be shown to be quite low.  The earnings esti-
mates are particularly weak, because earnings impacts were statisti-
cally significant only in the single Illinois offer.  The next section,
where B/C calculations are made for a set of hypothetical offers mak-
ing use of the combined data from all of the experiments, the results
are much stronger and the impact on UI benefits statistically signifi-
cant, thereby increasing our confidence in the results to some extent.  
The earnings estimates, where they are positive due to increased
employment, may overstate net benefits to society because they do not
take into account reduced utility for loss of home time (Gordon 1973)
and do not show any earnings offset because of displacement of nonpar-
ticipants.  They also do not take into account the potential entry effect
that would result from bonus offers encouraging more job leaving or
more layoffs.  The displacement and entry effects are discussed below.   
For Washington, only the high bonus offers generate net benefits
(Table 7.2).   Earning effects for low and medium-sized bonus offers
were usually negative, although the difference from controls was not
statistically significant (see Table 5.3, pp. 159–160).  
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Illinois shows positive social benefits for its only bonus offer
(Table 7.3), which conforms roughly to the mid-level offer in Washing-
ton and is somewhat larger than the low bonus offer in Pennsylvania.
The Illinois results are consistent with the findings for the long/low-
bonus-offer treatment in Pennsylvania but not with Washington, which
showed negative social benefits for low- and middle-sized bonuses.  
The second perspective is that of total government, including both
state and federal.  Benefits to government mirror those to the UI system
(the third perspective), with the added benefit of tax revenues generated
by the additional earnings of participants.  With regard to benefits
accruing to the government as a whole or the UI system specifically,
there are mixed results.  
In Pennsylvania, positive net benefits accrue to the government in
three of the four programs (Table 7.4).  The short qualification/low
bonus offer generated negative benefits to the government as a whole,
because of the large (though not statistically significant) negative
impact on earnings.  However, this program generated positive benefits
for the UI system, because reduction in UI payments more than cov-
ered bonus and administrative costs.  Only the short duration/high
bonus offer generated positive net benefits to both the government as a
whole and the UI system.
In Washington, small positive net benefits accrue to the govern-
ment only for the long qualification/low bonus and the short qualifica-
tion/high bonus treatments (see Table 7.2).  The other four offers all
generated negative net governmental benefits.  The small negative
number for the long qualification/high bonus offer was the result of the
large bonus payments outweighing the positive effects on earnings.
For the UI system, positive net benefits were generated by the long
qualification/low bonus offer.  We tend to discount this result because it
is inconsistent with that from all other treatments.
Only in Illinois do we find positive and large net benefits accruing
to the government in general or the UI system in particular.  Even for
the UI system, the program generates a benefit cost ratio of 2.7/1,
higher than that generated by any program option—even with higher
bonus offers—in Pennsylvania or Washington.  Thus, if the results of
the Illinois program prevailed, every $1 spent on the bonus program
would result in more than $2 in reduced UI compensation payment.  
234Table 7.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Washington Treatments, Four Quarters of Earnings
($ are per eligible claimant; ratios are for total program)
Variable Short/Low Short/Med. Short/High Long/Low Long/Med. Long/High
Change in earningsa ($) –239  –141  155  –197 –193  296
Change in tax receiptsb ($)  –60  –35  39  –49  –48     74
Change in UI benefit 
paymentsc ($)
   –22 28  117 112  44  135
Administrative costsd ($)      3  3   3   3  3 3
Bonus paymentse ($)     29  80 142  46 114 215
Net benefitsf ($)
Society –242 –144  152  –200 –196  293
Government –114 –90  11  14 –121     –9
UI system –54 –55 –28  63 –73 –83
Benefit/cost ratiog
Society negative negative 51/1 negative negative 99/1
Government negative negative  1.1/1 1.3/1 negative 0.96/1
UI system negative 0.33/1 0.8/1 2.3/1 0.4/1 0.6/1
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a Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as quarterly earnings reported for the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quar-
terly earnings in the subsequent three quarters (from Table 5.3, Chapter 5).
b Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
c From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.  A reduction in benefit payments is shown by a positive value in a cell.
d See Table 7A.1, p. 247.
e From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9-2A, p. 191.
f The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
g The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (Δearnings)/admin. expense
Government: (ΔUΙ comp. + Δtax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense)
UI system: (ΔUI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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Table 7.3 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Illinois Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
Variable Total FSC-elig. FSC-inelig.
Change in earningsa ($) 250
Change in tax receiptsb ($) 63
Change in UI benefit paymentsc ($) 150 228 57
Administrative costsd ($) 3 3 3
Bonus paymentse ($) 68 79 55
Net benefitsf ($)
Society 247
Government 142
UI system 79 146 –1
Benefit/cost ratiog
Society 83/1
Government 3.0/1
UI system 2.1/1 2.8/1 1/1
a Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as follows: quarterly earnings reported for
the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quarterly earnings in the subse-
quent three quarters.
b Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
c From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.
d From Table 7A.1, p. 247.
e From Spiegelman and Woodbury (1987), Table 5.1, and Davidson and Woodbury
(1991).
f The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
g The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (Δearnings)/admin. expense
Government: (ΔUΙ comp. + Δtax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense)
UI system: (ΔUI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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Table 7.4 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Pennsylvania Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
Variable Short/Low Short/High Long/Low Long/High
Change in earningsa ($) –269 133 166 175
Change in tax receiptsb
($)
–67 33 42 44
Change in UI benefit 
paymentsc ($)
99 99 67 133
Administrative costsd
($)
3 3 3 3
Bonus paymentse ($) 39 60 95 151
Net benefitsf ($)
Society –272 130 163 172
Government –10 69 11 23
UI system 57 36 –31 –21
Benefit/cost ratiog
Society negative 44/1 55/1 15/1
Government 0.76/1 2.1/1 1.1/1 1.1/1
UI system 2.35/1 1.6/1 0.7/1 0.9/1
a Equivalent to earnings increase, calculated as follows: quarterly earnings reported for
the treatment group in the quarter of filing plus the quarterly earnings in the subse-
quent three quarters.
b Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
c From Table 4.2, Chapter 4.
d From Table 7A.1. p. 247.
e From Corson et al. (1992), Tables IX/2–IX.5.
f The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
g The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (Δearnings)/admin. expense
Government: (ΔUΙ comp. + Δtax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense)
UI system: (ΔUI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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It was the substantial positive net benefits generated for the UI sys-
tem in Illinois that encouraged the U.S. Department of Labor to under-
take additional experiments with the goal of selecting an optimal
program.  The favorable Illinois results were not replicated in Pennsyl-
vania or Washington, however, leaving us with the preponderance of
evidence leaning to a conclusion that none of the observed levels of
bonus offers are likely to generate net benefits to the UI system.  How-
ever, the high bonus offers did generate positive societal benefits in
both Pennsylvania and Washington, and overall governmental benefits
in Pennsylvania.  This opens the possibility of undertaking the program
by either incurring some of the costs outside of the UI system (i.e.,
paying bonuses from general revenues) or by transferring funds into
the UI system to partially pay the bonus costs.
These results are, however, likely to be optimistic, since they do
not yet include the negative corrections for spillover effects as the
experiment moves into a full program (see discussion in Chapter 6 and
the benefit-cost corrections below).
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Four Hypothetical Programs
Four hypothetical programs were tested using fixed dollar bonuses
of $500 and $1000 and fixed qualification periods of 6 and 12 weeks.
The combined data from the Pennsylvania and Washington experi-
ments were used to determine the effects of these four programs (as
reported in Decker and O’Leary 1992).  These results provide a some-
what different perspective than the results of the tested treatments that
use weekly benefit amount (WBA) multipliers to generate the bonus
offer.  As noted in the sections above and as seen in Tables 7.2 and 7.4,
the high bonus multipliers generate the largest social benefits and usu-
ally the larger governmental benefits.  
The striking result from combining the data from the two experi-
ments is that all four options produce positive net social benefits.  Fur-
thermore, government as a whole benefits from three of the four
treatment alternatives, and even the UI system benefits from the low
bonus offer (Table 7.5).  In the hypothetical treatment, it is still true
that the high bonus treatments generated the highest social benefits—
because bonus payments are not social costs and administrative costs
are indifferent to the size of the bonus offer.  However, net benefits to
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Table 7.5 Benefit-Cost Analysis for Hypothetical Treatments,
Four Quarters of Earnings ($ per eligible claimant)
6 weeks 12 weeks
Variable $500 $1,000 $500 $1,000
Change in earningsa ($) 75 217 8 150
Change in tax receiptsb ($) 19 54 2 38
Change in UI benefit paymentsc ($) 69 105 101 137
Administrative costsd ($) 3 3 3 3
Bonus paymentse ($) 45 129 72 183
Net benefitsf ($)
Society 72 214 5 147
Government 40 27 28 –11
UI system 21 –27 2 –49
Benefit/cost ratiog
Society 24/1 71/1 1.7/1 49/1
Government 1.8/1 1.2/1 1.4/1 0.9/1
UI system 1.4/1 0.8/1 1.3/1 0.71/1
a Earning increase is positive.  Earnings are the earnings in the quarter of filing plus the
quarterly earnings in the subsequent three quarters.  Source: Decker and O’Leary
(1992), Table IV.7, p. 72.
b Estimated to be 25% of earnings.
c A reduction in UI benefit payments is positive.  Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992),
T.III.5, p. 52.
d From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9-3.
e From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), T.II.4, p. 32.
f The benefits and costs from the three perspectives are defined as follows:
Society: benefits = increased earnings
costs = administrative expenses
Government: benefits = change in UI compensation + change in tax revenues
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses
UI system:benefits = change in UI compensation
costs = bonus payments + administrative expenses.
g The benefit/cost ratios from the three perspectives are calculated as follows:
Society: (Δearnings)/admin. expense
Government: (ΔUΙ comp. + Δtax rev.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense)
UI system: (ΔUI comp.)/(bonus pay + admin. expense).
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the government as a whole and to the UI system are larger for the low
bonus offer treatments.  The results are not particularly sensitive to the
length of the qualification period.  The low bonus offer dominates
because the larger reduction in UI compensation payments caused by
the higher bonus offer is totally negated by the higher cost of bonus
payments.  In fact, these results suggest that a bonus offer of about
$500, with a relatively short qualification period, is optimal from the
governmental point of view, generating positive benefits to the govern-
ment as a whole and to the UI system.   The more socially beneficial
high bonuses would require some transfer of funds (or additional taxes)
to the UI system in order to compensate for their losses to government. 
ADJUSTMENT TO BENEFIT-COST ESTIMATIONS IN THE 
MOVE FROM EXPERIMENT TO PROGRAM
In Chapter 6, the issue of how the results of the bonus experiments
can be transferred to an actual reemployment bonus program is dis-
cussed.  Two of the issues addressed in that chapter are of particular
importance to an estimate of the net benefits to be derived from the
implementation of a bonus offer program.  These are the take-up rates
for both UI and the bonus, and secondly, the crowding-out effect of
bonus participation.
The UI take-up rates refer to the proportion of unemployed eligible
for UI benefits who actually file and receive such benefits.  As noted in
Chapter 6, this proportion in the three states conducting the experi-
ments was about 65 percent.  It may be expected that a bonus offer
increases the utility of filing UI claims for eligibles who might not oth-
erwise bother.  We will attempt to estimate the effect on the net benefit
calculation if the UI participation rate among eligible unemployed
increases from 65 to 75 percent.  A 15 percent increase in the UI take-
up rate is consistent with the estimates by Meyer (1995) in his critique
of the bonus experiments.3  In addition, a 75 percent participation rate
is on the high side for most government programs. 
The second participation issue is that of the bonus program itself.
In Chapter 3, it was estimated that only 55 percent of those eligible to
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receive bonuses actually collect them.  We attempt to determine the
effect on net benefits if this proportion increases to 75 percent.
“Crowding out” is what we call the tendency for bonus program
participants to take jobs that would otherwise by occupied by nonpar-
ticipants.  This issue, addressed in Chapter 6, will increase the unem-
ployment rate of these nonparticipants and therefore impose a cost on
both society and the government that is not taken into account in the
benefit calculation for the experiment.  Using the crowding-out param-
eters estimated in Chapter 6, we will estimate the effect on net benefits. 
The Effects on Net Benefits of Increased Take-Up
Our estimates of the effect on net benefits of increasing the UI
take-up rate from 65 to 75 percent is shown in column 2 of Table 7.6.
We start with the assumption that this increase in UI take-up has no
efficiency implications; that is, there is no change in employment or
earnings.  It is simply that unemployed persons file for benefits to
which they are already entitled and do not change their job search
behavior as a consequence.  If such additional filing is accompanied by
decreased exit or increased entry into unemployment, then there will be
additional negative impacts on net benefits.  However, considering only
the additional UI take-up without efficiency changes, there is still a sig-
nificant negative impact on net benefits derived by government or the
UI system.  As seen in Table 7.6, column 2, increasing the UI take-up
rate from 65 to 75 percent reduces the positive changes in UI payments
from $69 to $30 and increases the bonus payment costs from $45 to
$52 per experimental participant (including nonresponders and
responders who do not collect a bonus).  The impact on UI payments
from additional take-up is calculated using the formula derived by
Meyer (1995, Table 7-6).  As a result, the positive net benefits from a
$500 bonus offer with a six-week qualification period turn negative for
the government as a whole and the UI system.   
If the bonus take-up rate increases from 55 to 75 percent without
any changes in the UI take-up rate, the bonus cost naturally increases,
and the net benefits to government and the UI system decline (as shown
in Table 7.6, column 3), but the net benefits to these two constituencies
remain positive.  Naturally, if both take-up rates increase to 75 percent,
the negative effects are larger than either separately (see column 4) and
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Table 7.6 Benefit/Cost of Hypothetical Treatment (6 weeks/$500) with 
Additional UI and Bonus Take-Up
Parameter
UI take-up rate (%) 65 75 65 75
Bonus take-up rate (%) 55 55 75 75
Variable
Change in earningsa ($) 75 75 75 75
Change in tax receiptsb ($) 19 19 19 19
Change in UI payment ($) 69c 30d 69 30
Administrative coste ($) 3 4 3 4
Bonus payments ($) 45f 52g 61h 70i
Net benefitsj ($)
Society 72 71 72 71
Government 40 –7 24 –25
UI system 21 –26 5 –40
a The positive change in earnings is the same as in Table 7.5.  It is the earnings change
generated by the response to the bonus offer.  Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992),
Table IV.7, p. 72.
b As in Table 7.5, tax receipts to all government is estimated at 25% of earnings gain.
c Positive change in UI payment for columns 1 and 3 are the same as in Table 7.5.
Source: Decker and O’Leary (1992), T.III.5, p. 52.
d Positive change in UI payments for columns 2 and 4, responding to the projected
increase in UI take-up rate, is calculated using the formula in Meyer (1995).   The for-
mula is change in UI payment (new) = change in UI payment (old) – (av. WBA × av.
weeks of benefit receipt for recipients terminating benefits before 6 weeks × change
in ratio of new to old UI take-up rate).  The average WBA is calculated as the average
for the control group in the three states of the ratio of dollars of UI compensation to
insured weeks shown in Table 4.1.  The average weeks of benefit receipt for recipi-
ents terminating benefits is derived using the average of the UI hazard rates for spell
lengths less than 6 weeks for the controls in the three states shown in Table 4.5.  The
calculation is: 69 – ($145 × 1.75 × 0.154) = 30.
e From Spiegelman, O’Leary, and Kline (1992), Table 9.3.
f From Table 7.5, column 1.
g $45 × ratio of new to old UI take-up rate (i.e., $45 × 75%/65% = $45 × 1.154 = $52).
h $45× ratio of new to old bonus take-up rate (i.e., $45 × 75%/55% = $45 × 1.36 =
$61).
i $45 × ratio of new to old UI take-up rate × ratio of new to old bonus take-up rate (i.e.,
$45 × 1.154 × 1.36 = $70).
j Formulas for calculating net benefits are shown in footnote to Table 7.5.
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result in negative net benefits to government and the UI system.  How-
ever, none of these changes in take-up affect benefits to society, since
we have hypothesized that these changes would take place without any
changes in unemployment and therefore without any earnings impacts.
Thus, it is still true that by raising additional taxes to pay the bonuses,
society would be better off, even if both UI and bonus take-up rates
increase as shown in Table 7.6.  
The Effects on Net Benefits of Crowding Out
Crowding out is the term used in Chapter 6 to describe the reduced
employment probabilities of unemployed workers who do not respond
to the bonus offer.  They are either claimants who ignore the bonus offer
or nonclaimants who may or may not be eligible for UI.  Using column
4 in Table 6.2, we estimate the effect on earnings of crowding out.  For
the BCA, we estimate the crowding out ratio differently from that in
Table 6.2.  Since the negative effect on earnings of those UI claimants
who do not respond to the bonus have already been included in the earn-
ings impacts reported in Chapter 5 and the previous sections of Chapter
7, the numerator of the crowding-out ratio need only include those
workers who are not in the experimental population (i.e., the UI eligible
nonclaimants and the UI-ineligibles).  Thus, the corrected crowding-out
ratio (based on the numbers reported on line 3 of Table 6.2) is (103 +
94)/297 = 0.65.  Since this ratio is based on changes in employment, it
is necessary to weight each of the employment impact numbers by
appropriate rate of annual earnings. We see below that this correction
causes the ratio to fall to 0.5, calculated as follows:
(103 × 5100 + 94 × 7000)/(415 × 8200 – 118 × 8800) = 0.50.
The increased earnings of $75 in column 1 of Tables 7.5 and 7.6 is
reduced to $37.50 due to crowding out.   The change in tax receipts is
appropriately changed for Table 7.7.  Otherwise, the change in UI pay-
ments, administrative costs and bonus payments are as shown in Table
7.6.  As a result of crowding out, all the net benefits are lower than
reported in Table 7.6 due to the reduced positive effects on earnings.
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Table 7.7 Benefit/Cost of Hypothetical Treatment (6 weeks/$500) with 
Additional UI and Bonus Take-Up and Crowding Out
Parameter
UI take-up rate (%) 65 75
Bonus take-up rate (%) 55 75
Variable
Benefits ($)
Increased earningsa 37.50 37.50
Tax receipts 9.38 9.38
UI benefit payments 69 30
Costs ($)
Administrative costs 3 4
Bonus paymentsb 45 70
Net benefits ($)
Society 34.50 33.50
Government 30.38 –34.62
UI system 0 –44
a See text for the calculations.  The earnings impact from Table 7.6, $75, is multiplied
by 1 minus the crowding-out ratio of 0.50.
b Bonus payment from columns 1 and 4, Table 7.6.
CONCLUSIONS
The benefit-cost analysis certainly does not provide unambiguous
support for a bonus offer program.  Based on the Washington and
Pennsylvania results, societal benefits are strongly positive for the high
bonus program.  This finding is influenced by the very low costs of
administering the program, and these are the only costs that effect soci-
ety as a whole.  The changes in UI compensation and the bonus pay-
ments represent transfer payments and do not enter the benefit-cost
calculation for society as a whole.  These benefits and costs do enter
the calculus for governmental benefits and, in that arena, the bonus
offer rarely generates positive benefits to the UI system, as the
decreases in UI compensation are usually outgunned by higher bonus
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costs.  This undoubtedly reflects the payments of bonuses to a large
number of UI recipients who would return to work quickly without the
incentive of a bonus offer.  However, the addition of tax revenues from
increased earnings does bring about positive overall governmental ben-
efits in 6 of the 11 program offers (6 in Washington, 4 in Pennsylvania
and 1 in Illinois).
By combining all the data in the construction of hypothetical treat-
ments (namely 6- and 12-week qualification periods and $500 and
$1000 bonuses), the results show large social benefits to high bonuses,
and positive benefits to government in three out of four programs, and
to the UI system in two of the four programs.  This is more encourag-
ing.
A problem arises, however, when we recognize that only half of
claimants eligible to receive bonuses actually collect them and when
we attempt to correct for entry and crowding-out effects.   These effects
clearly reduce any net positive benefits from the offer program.  How-
ever, encouragement might be taken from the fact that, using the com-
bined data and one hypothetical treatment (six-week qualification
period and $500 bonus), even allowing for a 50 percent increase in
bonus take-up, 15 percent increase in entry into UI, and a crowding-out
effect due to the reduced employment of those not offered or eligible
for a bonus, there is still positive net benefits to society as a whole for
this bonus offer program. 
Notes
1. This estimate compares with a cost of $31 per claimant estimated in Pennsylva-
nia.  This large difference arises for several reasons.  First, while the Pennsylvania
estimate deducted costs associated solely with experimental operations, all other
demonstration costs were included in the estimates.  Second, these costs included
sizable costs for central and local office Job Service personnel who were used to
make the bonus offer.  Third, all costs were also assumed to be variable and no
assumptions concerning economies of scale were imposed on the estimates.  If,
instead, it is assumed that UI staff rather than Job Service staff will provide infor-
mation on the bonus offer as part of the claims process and if it is assumed that
central office supervisory costs are fixed, administrative costs in Pennsylvania
equal approximately $11 per claimant.
2. In order to add together and compare benefits and costs that occur over time, or
that occur in different years, it is necessary to discount future effects.  In the BCA
for a bonus offer, most, if not all, the benefits and costs occur in a single year.  A
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possible exception would be the longer run earnings effects of accepting less than
optimal jobs in order to become reemployed sooner.  It might take several years to
regain full earning potential.  A key issue in discounting is the selection of the dis-
count rate.  The long-term Treasury Bond rate is often used and is certainly appro-
priate for three perspectives considered in this analysis.
3. Meyer (1995) estimated that a $500 bonus offer with a 10-week qualification
period could be expected to increase UI take-up by at least 7 to 12 percent.  He
claimed that this is an underestimate, making our 15 percent increase reasonable.
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Appendix Table 7A.1 Administrative Costs for an Ongoing Bonus 
Offer Program
Central office cost (1988 $)
1 program administrator and 1 clerical assistant 45,900
Fringe benefits at 28.3% 12,990
Nonpersonnel services at 16% of salary 7,344
Administrative, staff and technical cost at 16.35% 7,505
73,739
Total new intra-state claims, FY90 227,484
Central office cost per new claim 0.32
Job service center costsa
Time per 
operation Units per claim $ per claim
Additional time for the initial claim 2 minutes 1 0.64
Processing bonus payments 4.5 minutesb 0.129c 0.19
Allowance 27 minutesd 0.129c 1.11
Denials 27 minutesd 0.029e 0.25
Appeals
Lower level 34 minutes
Higher level 20 minutesf 0.002g 0.01
2.20
Total cost per claimant 2.52
Total cost per eligible claimant 
(add 16%)
2.92
a Costs per minute: JSC Specialist II at 1,776 per month, plus fringe benefits at 28.3%,
nonpersonnel services at 16%, and AST costs at 16.35% of salary = $1,776 × 1.6065
= $3,705 per month/9600 minutes per month = $0.32 per minute.
b Allowed time for processing a Continued Claim Form.
c Ratio of total bonuses to initial claims in experiment, i.e., 1,816/14,080 (see Table
3.1, Chapter 3).
d Time allowed for a nonseparation denial or allowance.
e Ratio of NOH and bonus denials to initial claims in experiment, i.e., (278 + 130) ÷
14,080 (see Table 3.1, Chapter 3).
f Time allowed for lower and higher level appeals.
g Proportion of nonseparation appeals to initial claims: 0.06 × 0.029 (lower) + 0.01 ×
0.029 (higher) = 0.07 × 0.029 = 0.002.
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